![]() In spite of its early research in digital photography, the company culture had a bias against electronics that went back to the days of Edwin Land. That was a major hypothesis that I believed in my marrow that was wrong."Įven though it performed thorough market research, Polaroid was unable to foresee that the photo album would be replaced by the digital slide show.Ī related mistaken belief was that the Polaroid Corporation would always be able to make money through developments in chemistry, especially photographic chemistry. "This was the major mistake we all made: Mac Booth, Gary DiCamillo, people after me…. "It's amazing, but kids today don't want hard copy anymore," said DiCamillo. When customers abandoned the print, Polaroid was taken by surprise. Gary DiCamillo, CEO from 1995 to 2001, said in a 2008 interview at Yale, "People were betting on hard copy and media that was going to be pick-up-able, visible, seeable, touchable, as a photograph would be." Through the 1990s, Polaroid executives continued to believe in the importance of the paper print. Whether that record fulfills an emotional requisite in the visual diaries of amateur photography or provides practical data in an industrial or scientific setting, the universal insatiable appetite for visual communication and portable information will be constant, reflecting a continuing need for instantly available, high-quality print media." ![]() MacAllister Booth reasoned, "As electronic imaging becomes more prevalent,there remains a basic human need for a permanent visual record. In his 1985 letter to stockholders, CEO I. Why was Polaroid unable to make the transition to digital photography? The key may have been some fundamental assumptions that did not allow top management to adjust to new market realities.įirst, Polaroid leaders believed that customers would always want a hard-copy print. Film sales plummeted, and in October 2001, Polaroid filed for bankruptcy. As digital cameras flooded the market, Polaroid began losing some of its big customers in the real estate, insurance, and photo identi-fication businesses. However, the company was unable to capitalize on this success. By the late 1990s Polaroid was a top seller of digital cameras. Then in 1981, an official electronic imaging group was set up to develop a "printer in the field," an instant camera that would produce a film-based print from a digital image.īy 1989, 42% of Polaroid's research and development funding was being spent on digital imaging. During the mid-1960s, Polaroid took out some of the first patents on electronic shutters. However, Polaroid was not unaware of the progress of electronic imaging on the contrary, the company was involved in developments in the field early on. The basis for the instant camera was a chemical process that mimicked the darkroom. At its peak the company employed 21,000 people. The invention was an immediate success, and over the next two decades, the instant camera became widely used both in the consumer market and in the business market for such purposes as driver's licenses, crime reports, and real estate advertising.īy the 1960s and early '70s, Polaroid held a monopoly in the instant photography market, and its sales accounted for about 20% of the overall market for film and 15% of the U.S. In 1948, in response to a question from his young daughter, Land invented a camera that produced finished photographs in minutes. Founded in 1937 by scientist Edwin Land, the company built its initial business during the interwar period, prospered as a defense contractor during World War II, and then found new success as an innovator in the post-war boom years. ![]() Polaroid was one of America's early high-tech success stories. ![]()
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